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EMASCULATING STATE ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT:
THE SUPREME COURT'S SELECTIVE ADOPTION OF THE
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
DION W. HAYES*

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.'
PREEMPTION GENERALLY

The supremacy of federal law over state law derives directly from
the United States Constitution.2 The United States Supreme Court finds
preemption of state law in three circumstances. 3 First, Congress can
define explicitly the extent to which its enactments preempt state law.4
Preemption is a question of congressional intent, and when Congress
chooses to express a preemptive intent explicitly, the courts easily can
decide that preemption is appropriate. Often, however, Congress does not
make its intent readily apparent in its statutory language.'
The second area in which the courts usually find preemption is that
of "field preemption."' In the absence of explicit statutory language,
federal law preempts state law that regulates conduct in a field that
Dion Hayes received his B.A. in History from the University of Virginia in 1989,
and is currently a third year law student at William and Mary.
1. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
2. Id.

3. English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct.2270 (1990); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963).
4. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 85.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 27 (1988).
6. English, 110 S.CL at 2275.
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Congress intended the federal government to occupy exclusively.! The
courts will infer such an intent from a "scheme of federal regulation ...
so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it," or where an Act of Congress
"touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the subject."8 When the field which Congress allegedly has preempted
includes areas that have "been traditionally occupied by the States,"
however, congressional intent to supersede state laws must be "clear and
manifest. ""
Finally, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually and
practically conflicts with federal law. ° The Court has found preemption
where a private party could not possibly comply with both state and
federal requirements." State law is also preempted where it "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."' 2
THE MANIPULABLE NATURE OF PREEMPTION STANDARDS
The three categories of preemption outlined above are not rigidly
distinct. A federal law may be found to have preemptive effect based on
both field preemption and conflict preemption. Nor does the Court apply
the three categories uniformly or predictably.
In its preemption decisions the Court must weigh conflicting
institutional concerns that extend beyond the particular cases before it. 3

7. Id.
8. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
9. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
10. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
11. Id. at 142-43 (finding preemption where compliance with state agricultural
regulations would preclude compliance with federal regulations).
12. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
13. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 268 (1978).
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When Congress fails to address explicitly the question of preemption in the
statute involved, the Court has wide discretion to find field preemption,
conflict preemption, or no preemptive effect.' 4

The Court, in finding

field or conflict preemption, engages in institutional activism toward the

states." s
"Tradition," as used in the Court's field preemption analysis, is a
very subjective basis on which to hinge the states' only chance to preserve
their statutes in areas in which Congress chooses to legislate
expansively. 6 Using "pervasiveness" as the only prerequisite for finding
a congressional statute to have implicit preemptive effect does not provide
any real check on Congress' legislative powers or on Congress' effect on
state laws. Even when state laws pursue the same goals as a federal
statute, the doctrine of preemption gives Congress vast power over state
law."'
In no area has the Court employed a more myopic view of
"tradition" than in the area of environmental law statutes. Until about
1976, the Court upheld state law supplemental remedies as consistent with
a congressional goal of environmental protection.18 In the last decade,
however, this "tradition" of concurrent jurisdiction seemingly
evaporated. 9 Congress did not begin suddenly to employ explicit
preemptive language in its environmental statutes. Rather, the Court
abdicated its previously held presumption against preemption in the
absence of an express congressional directive.
In 1947, the Court opined that state law preemption cases "start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
17. NOWACK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, at 315.

18. Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Lake Carriers'
Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
19. See infra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing modification of presumption
against preemption).
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to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."'2 This doctrine put the burden of proving the
"clear and manifest purpose of Congress" squarely on the shoulders of the
party seeking a ruling of preemption.2'
PREEMPTION OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES

Since 1976, the Court has diluted, subverted, and finally reversed
the previously prevailing presumption against preemption of state
environmental laws. 22 The abandonment of this principle threatens states'
attempts to improve the environment and jeopardizes the principles of
federalism.
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,23 the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of the Washington Tanker Law, 4 which regulated the
design, size, and movement of oil tankers in the Puget Sound. Examining
the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972,5 the Court
concluded that this federal law preempted the state statute. 26 The Court
in Ray recited its traditional presumption against the preemption of state
laws enacted under the states' police power, but the Court's holding ran
contrary to this presumption.2z The presumption as applied in Ray is
nothing but a toothless rule of law easily overcome by the flimsiest
evidence of preemptive intent on the part of Congress.
The Court in Ray found that the imposition by the state of
Washington of "standard safety features" on oil tankers using the Puget

20. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
21. Id.
22. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S.
355 (1986); Ray v. Ad. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).

23. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.170 (Supp. 1975).

25. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227, 46 U.S.C. § 391a (1970 ed., Supp. V).

168.
27. Id. at 157, 174-75.
26. Ray, 435 U.S. at
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Sound frustrated Congress' attempt to promulgate uniform national
standards for the design and construction of tankers.2 The Washington
statute had imposed higher standards on oil tanker design than had the
federal statute.

9

Ray did not involve a private litigant's inability to

comply with both state and federal law simultaneously. Washington State
simply desired more safety precautions on tankers in Puget Sound than
Congress had imposed nationally. °
It is difficult to imagine how the state law at issue in Ray could
possibly thwart the goals and objectives of the federal law. The Court
conceded in its opinion that both pieces of legislation were aimed
"precisely at the same ends."'" The Court's assumption that when
a
federal law and a state law pursue the same end, the state law somehow
automatically prevents attainment of that objective belies the existence of
multi-purpose legislation. The assumption also prevents states from
requiring higher standards than those which Congress mandated, to the
detriment of environmental protection.
In the Ports and Waterways Act, Congress used the word
"minimum" to describe the Act's standards. 2 The Court did not construe
this usage to mean that Congress intended to allow states to impose higher
standards than those in the Act. Rather, the Court strained to find an
intent on the part of Congress to promulgate uniform standards
nationally.3 3 This intent is absent from the language of the statute and
from the legislative history. Indeed, the varied natures and capacities of
our nation's ports require otherwise.'

The Court inferred this intent from

both the "statutory pattern" and the application of the Act to foreign
vessels, an area that the Court believed required uniform national

28. Id. at 160-63.
29. Id. at 165.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 161 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 391a(1) (1970 ed., Supp. V)).
'33. Id. at 163.
34. Id. at 186 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
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standards."
Although field preemption and conflict preemption may overlap,
insufficient evidence of both does not coalesce into sufficient evidence for
preemption generally, contrary to the Court's convolutions in Ray. Field
and conflict preemption are alternative bases for a holding of preemption,
not complementary bases. 3 '
After Ray, the Court displayed similar enthusiasm for the
preemption of state environmental law.' In 1985, the Court held that
state law obligations to clean up toxic waste sites were claims
The Court claimed that this case
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 38
concerned the proper construction of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, and the
Court conspicuously neglected to mention the presumption against
39
preemption of state law.
In Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,4 the Court found that New Jersey's
attempt to create a cleanup fund for leaking toxic waste disposal sites
The Court held that section 114(c) of
violated the supremacy clause.4
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act ("CERCLA") 41 preempted a state statute that taxed major petroleum
and chemical facilities in the state to create such a fund.43 The Court
initially stated that the case was simply one of "express preemption" in
which the Court "need go no further than the statutory language to
determine whether the state statute [was] preempted."44 The Court did
find, however, that the applicable provisions of CERCLA were unartfully

35. Id. at 163, 166-68.
36. LAWRENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 384 (1978).
37. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
38. Id.

39. Id. at 284.
40. 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
41. Id.

42. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (1988).

43. Kovacs, 475 U.S. at 355.
44. Id. at 362.
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drafted and unclear, and therefore turned to legislative history to determine
congressional intent regarding preemption. 5 Although the Court agreed
with the State of New Jersey that the state statute furthered the
congressional intent to eliminate threats to public health and safety
generated by improperly managed hazardous waste disposal facilities, the
Court inexplicably went on to infer an additional congressional intent: the
intent to avoid damaging the American chemical industry through
excessive taxation.4 This intent manifests itself nowhere in the statutory
language or legislative history of CERCLA.
The Court's holding in Hunt constituted an ironic footnote to the
history of legislative efforts to deal with the clean-up of hazardous waste
disposal sites. New Jersey's Spill Compensation and Control Act of
The Court's anti197647 constituted the model for CERCLA. 48
environmental application of the preemption doctrine in the face of
congressional silence on the issue indicates why many commentators feel
that the federalization of environmental law has occurred at the expense
of our natural resources.4 9

In the afore-mentioned cases, the Court failed to apply the
presumption against preemption in the absence of express congressional

direction. The Court claims that evidence of field or conflict preemption
may be sufficient to override the presumption. At the same time, the
Court's failure in many recent environmental cases to mention the
previously prevailing presumption represents an evolving favoritism
towards regulatory preemption. The Court continued its emasculation of
the presumption against preemption in two more cases involving
environmental statutes, in 1987 and 1990.
In International Paper Company v. Ouellette,' the Court
45. Id. at 363-65.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 371-72.
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11b (1982).
John Pendergrass, Where the Action Is, 8:1 THE ENVTL F. 7 (Jan./Feb. 1991).
Id.

50. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
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discarded an apparent congressional intent not to preempt state law, and
reversed the traditional presumption against such preemption. 5
The
Court held that in interstate water disputes the Clean Water Act preempts
common law actions under the law of the affected state.52 Reversing the
presumption, the Court asserted that preemption may be presumed when
federal legislation is sufficiently comprehensive to indicate Congress'
desire to preclude supplementary state legislation.5 3
The presumption which the majority (joined by Justice Rehnquist)
applied in Ouellette contradicts Justice Rehnquist's opinion in City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee 1I).- 4 In Milwaukee 1H Justice Rehnquist
wrote that the Court starts with the assumption that state police powers are
not preempted "unless [preemption] was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."5 5

In the same case Justice Rehnquist wrote that "the
comprehensive character of a federal statute" would not be relevant to a
state preemption issue.
In both Milwaukee II and Ouellette the Court
s
to foster accountability among polluters; 1
efforts
struck down state
therein lies their doctrinal reconciliation.
The Court in Ouellette further held that in light of the Clean Water
Act's pervasive regulation of water pollution, "it is clear that the only state
[common law] suits that remain available are those specifically preserved
by the Act."5'8 The legislative history of the Clean Water Act, however,
reveals that Congress never considered the issue raised in Ouellette.5 9
The Senate report of the bill suggests that compliance with the Clean

51. Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 494.
Id. at 491.
451 U.S. 304 (1981).
Id. at 316 (citation omitted).

56. Id. at 319 n.14.
57. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 493.
58. Id. at 492.
59. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 81. reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3746-47.
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Water Act would not be a defense in a private damage action.'
In fact, the Clean Water Act expressly reserved to the states the
right to impose more stringent controls than those contained in the Act.6 ,
The Court ignored this express direction of Congress and turned to the
goals and policies of the Act to determine whether Congress intended to
preempt state common law remedies in interstate pollution disputes.

2

As

it did in Exxon Corp., the Court rejected the argument that ambiguities
should be resolved in the manner most consistent with the statute's
ultimate goal of eliminating water pollution.6 3 Without supporting
references, the Court concluded that Congress intended considerations such
as economic and technological feasibility to temper the statute's ultimate
goals. 64
The Court's finding of preemption in Ouellete contradicts the
express language in the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act
preserving state law remedies. 65 Legislative history indicating that
compliance with minimum federal standards would not be a defense to
actions based on more stringent state standards illustrated Congress' intent
not to preempt state law.' The Court claimed that allowing affected
states to impose more stringent standards would upset the balance between
pollution control and economic efficiency established by the agencies to
whom Congress had delegated the task.67 The Court's concern was not
shared by Congress.

60. Id.
61. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 (b)(1)(c), 1370(1) (1982). See also S. REP. NO. 414,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3751 (stating that "[t]his
section of the Act retains the right of any State or locality to adopt or enforce... any.
requirement... more stringent than those required or established under this Act.").
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 493.
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494-95.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1988).
See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 493 n.13 (quoting S.REP. No. 92-414, 2 LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER

67. Id. at 494-95.

AcT at 1499 (1971)).
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The Court further obscured the muddled area of preemption in a

1990 hydroelectric case when it failed to articulate clearly whether it was
basing its finding of preemption on a field theory or a conflict theory.68
In California v. FERC, 9 the Court held that the Federal Power Act
("FPA") preempted California's requirements for minimum stream flow for
a river on which a federally licensed hydroelectric project was located. 0
Initially, the Court seemed to adopt a conflict analysis in its preemption
decision.7 ' The Court announced that state law is preempted to the extent
that it "actually conflicts with federal law," that California's flow
requirements would "disturb and conflict with the balance embodied in"
the decisions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), and
that the California requirements could result in a "veto" of the project.72
This wording suggests that state law is preempted only to the extent that
it actually conflicts with FERC regulation.
Other language in the opinion, however, suggests that Congress has
"occupied the field" of hydropower regulation. 73 The Court concluded
that section 27 of the FPA74 provides for "exclusive federal regulation of
hydropower projects", implying that state regulation in that area is
impermissible regardless of whether it conflicts with federal regulation."

68. California v. FERC, 110 S. Ct. 2024 (1990).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2028.
71. Id. at 2033-34.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2029.
74. Section 27 of the FPA reads as follows:

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed
as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to
interfere with the laws of the respective States relating
to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of
water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses,
or any vested right acquired therein.
16 U.S.C. § 821 (1988).
75. California v. FERC, 110 S. Ct. at 2029.
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The Court also stated that section 27 is limited to "proprietary rights,

41
76

implying that all forms of state regulation of hydropower uses are

impermissible.
Whether the Court in California v. FERC based its preemption
holding on field or conflict theory significantly affects state water rights
regulation. If Congress occupies the field exclusively, then nearly five
hundred licenses issued to or applied for by hydropower projects in the
state of California alone would be void ab initio.7 Under a conflict
theory, all such permits would be valid to the extent that the conditions
contained therein do not actually conflict with FERC requirements.
Through its unartfully crafted opinion in Californiav. FERC, the Court has
left unanswered the question of whether the states have any meaningful
role to play in hydropower development.
Private parties also have used congressional ambiguity on the issue
of preemption for financial gain. 7 The Supreme Court in 1990 refused
to hear the case of Onan Corp. v. Industrial Steel Container Co.,79 which
involved the extent to which state corporation law precluded suits against
a dissolved company under CERCLA. Onan had contributed to cleanup
costs for a site in Andover, Minnesota and later sued Industrial Steel to
recover part of those costs.' In October 1983, Industrial Steel filed for
dissolution.81 Industrial Steel claimed in 1988 that it was immune from
suits under state corporation law because it had dissolved more than three
years earlier.8 2 The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota and

76. Id. at 2029, 2031.
77. Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.2, California v. FERC, 110 S.Ct. 2024 (1990) (No. 89333).

78. Onan Corp. v. Indus. Steel Container Co., 909 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 431 (1990).
79. 111 S. Ct. 431 (1990).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed.83
Federal courts disagree on this issue, but the Supreme Court failed
to grant certiorari to clear up the discrepancy." Congress' ambiguity and
the Court's failure to develop a meaningful test for preemption in the
environmental area have hampered efforts to hold polluters accountable.
The effect of the muddled area of preemption thus extends from the
federal government's enforcement actions to private litigants' use of
preemption for financial gain.
POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE SUPREME COURT'S POSTURE

The federalization of environmental regulation has not furthered
environmentalism. Although the federal government may be better able
to regulate such areas as air or transboundary water pollution, the states
have initiated most innovations in environmental policy. 5 Pennsylvania's
Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act of 1963 provided the
model for the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977.6 More than one year before Congress amended the Clean Air Act,
Louisiana passed a law to reduce toxic air emissions by fifty percent
Also, in .1989, Massachusetts and Oregon each
within five years.'
8
enacted statutes designed to reduce toxic pollution across all media.
States have surpassed the federal government in promulgating new and
more stringent regulatory standards as well. California has taken the lead
in the area of air pollution, and the federal government looks to that state
for guidance as to what standards to promulgate nationally.

9

83. See Onan Corp. v. Indus. Steel Corp., 909 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1990) (Table, No.
89-5387); Onan Corp. v. Indus. Steel Corp., 770 F. Supp 490 (D. Minn. 1989).
84. Onan Corp., I II S. Ct. at 43 1.
85. Pendergrass, supra note 48, at 7.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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One of the motivations for the Supreme Court's willingness to find
preemption of state anti-pollution statutes even where Congress has
expressed a contrary intent may be a perception that the federal
government is better equipped to clean up and prevent damage to the
environment. This theory seems doubtful, however, when the court admits
that efficiency is not one of the values it seeks to protect in its preemption
decisions."
Regardless of whether such a perception motivates the Court, the
perception is not well-founded. For example, state hazardous substance
cleanup programs have been eminently more successful than the federal
Superfund program.9" The federal Superfund program was authorized to
receive $8.5 billion for the five-year period 1986-91, or about $1.7 billion
per year (though the Environmental Protection Agency never actually
received this much). 92 As of August, 1990, the hazardous substance
cleanup programs in forty-nine states (only Nebraska does not have one)
had available approximately $2.43 billion for cleanups in 1990 alone."
CONCLUSION

While the Constitution does not enumerate the power to regulate
business to protect the natural environment as a power of the federal
government, one cannot responsibly advocate the federal government's
abdication of the responsibility it has assumed in that arena. The
environment would benefit from the resurrection of the tradition of
concurrent jurisdiction that prevailed in the environmental area prior to
1976.
The Supreme Court acts with institutional restraint when it
interprets an explicit directive regarding preemption from Congress as

90. "[I]t is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right... ." Square D Co. v.Niagara Frontier Tariff Bur., Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424
(1986).
91. Pendergrass, supra note 48 at 7.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Congress intended the law to take effect. The Court correctly states that
Congress is the governmental body best equipped to assess whether federal
and state regulation can coexist successfully." When the Court reaches
beyond any directive from Congress and finds in legislative history or
another source a presumed intent of Congress as to preemption and so
invalidates a state anti-pollution law, the Court enlarges its role and
engages in unwarranted judicial activism toward the states.
If, as many Court observers suggest, the justices are acutely aware
of the political implications of their decisions, then the justices must also
be aware of the grassroots support in this country for the preservation of
the natural environment. The Court's decisions in the environmental area
almost uniformly have hindered the states' efforts to clean up the
environment. Concurrent jurisdiction is the best approach to take in the
area of environmental regulation. The sooner the Court realizes this and
resurrects the presumption against preemption, the more effective antipollution efforts at both the state and federal levels will become.

94. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981).

